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INTEREST ARBITRATION IMPASSE RATES
DANIEL RICKETSON
University of Rhode Island
Interest arbitration is an important tool in public sector bargaining, since public safety workers
are prohibited from striking. There is concern, however, over the effects of interest arbitration
on impasse rates, most notably theorized by the so-called “chilling” and “narcotic” effects.
Overall, interest arbitration has been associated with an increase in impasse rates compared to
situations where workers are allowed to go on strike, but the reasons and extent to which this
is the case are debatable. Previous theoretical work suggests a strong chilling effect on
negotiations when interest arbitration is an option, but the empirical support for this theory is
limited. As well, empirical support for a narcotic effect is weak, at least after the first three
years of bargaining under interest arbitration. Although we are generally in a period
retrenchment of bargaining rights, this issue remains an important one, particularly in states
where the extension of interest arbitration to new groups (e.g. teachers) is being debated and
in light of the interest arbitration provisions of recent Employee Free Choice Act.

In U.S. labor relations, two parties come
together to negotiate a contract.
In the
overwhelming number of cases a settlement is
reached without impasse. There are, however,
times when the process breaks down. In the
private sector, when an agreement cannot be
reached, a job action may occur: workers may
strike or the employer may lock out. In the public
sector, strikes and lockouts are widely prohibited.
And this is universally true for public safety
workers, hence the need for an orderly process to
deal with negotiations impasses.
Currently, the most popular process to settle
public safety workers' contracts is interest
arbitration. With interest arbitration a single thirdparty neutral or tripartite panel decides, in
accordance with statute and/or regulation, what
the terms of new agreement will be. The threat of
interest arbitration is meant to urge the two
parties to come up with a mutual agreement
rather than face terms imposed by a third party.
In that interest arbitration may be less costly
than a strike or lockout, there is some question as
to the strength of the threat of interest
arbitration. However, there does not appear to be
a readily available method of impasse resolution
that is better than interest arbitration in most
cases.

Given that interest arbitration is the most
common method for ending impasses among
public safety employees, it is important to look at
whether or not this system works as it is intended.
The main question concerns the practice’s impact
on impasse rates. When the two parties come
together to negotiate a contract, does the threat
of interest arbitration move them to be more
likely to settle through negotiations, or to use
interest arbitration? There are multiple factors
that affect a negotiator’s mindset, however this
paper attempts to discover what impact interest
arbitration has on settlement rates. There is also
the question of what form of interest arbitration
has the least impact on impasse rates, be it
conventional arbitration or “final offer”
arbitration. These two forms are the most
commonly used forms of interest arbitration, so
knowing which one is more effective at persuading
the parties to come to an agreement on their own
is important.
FRAMEWORK AND MODEL
Types of Interest Arbitration
At its core, interest arbitration is a process
wherein an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators takes
evidence from both the employer and the union
and ultimately fashions a collective bargaining
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agreement. The arbitrator uses information such
as past agreements, similar agreement, and the
parties’ current offers to decide on an appropriate
contract. Like a grievance procedure that ends in
arbitration, the hope is that both parties will be
able to come to an agreement before the final
step, i.e. a third party decision, is necessary.
In practice, there are two types of Interest
arbitration. The first type of interest arbitration is
generally referred to as “conventional” interest
arbitration. This form forces the arbitrator to
make a decision that is somewhere within the
bounds of the final offers of the two parties. The
second type is known as “final offer” or “last best
offer” arbitration. With final offer arbitration, the
arbitrator must choose one of the parties’ final
offers. These different methods are important in
that they each have a distinct effect on the
negotiation process.
Conventional Interest Arbitration. In
conventional interest arbitration, the arbitrator is
free to give an award that is either one side's final
offer, or somewhere in between the final offers.
This method gives the widest range of possibilities
for a contract. It is also the most commonly
practiced form of interest arbitration. The idea
behind this structure is that there is uncertainty on
where between the final offers the arbitrator will
decide. This is somewhat undermined by the fact
that many states require in their law that an
arbitrator base his/her decision on a rigid equation
including ability to pay and comparability to other
agreements. It is important to note that this
method has been seen to provide less of a chilling
effect than final offer arbitration has in
observational studies (Dickinson, 2004). Of the
two methods of interest arbitration, this approach
seems to lead to the best chance of a negotiated
settlement.
Final Offer Arbitration. Final offer arbitration
is newer than conventional interest arbitration, as
it was first developed in 1966 (Hanany, Kilgour, &
Gerchak, 2007) and first used in 1971 in Oregon
(Subbarao, 1978). This method is further divided
into two different approaches. One of these
approaches is to look at the full final offers from
both sides, and to choose one of them as being the
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best option. The other method is to look at each
outstanding issue and to choose one side’s over
the others on an issue by issue basis. One issue
with final offer arbitration is that it has a tendency
to force both sides into Nash's equilibrium, leaving
both sides unwilling to move adjust their stances
in order to settle the contract. The arbitrator will
decide which side has the fairest offer, so if both
sides believe that theirs is fair and stand nothing
to gain from any concession, they will not likely
arrive at a negotiated settlement.
Legal Framework
One important point is that each state (and, in
some cases, municipalities or agencies) has the
ability to make its own rules regarding interest
arbitration. Employees covered by interest
arbitration statutes are generally public safety
workers in a particular state, so it is up to that
state to make the rules surrounding settling
negotiations. Most states that use interest
arbitration have a system where arbitrators are
allowed, and even encouraged, to mediate the
disagreement throughout the arbitration
proceedings (Malin, 2013). Other states see
arbitration as more of a legal proceeding, where
there are strict rules regarding how each section
of the contract is awarded (Malin, 2013). In these
states, there are instances of judges overturning
contracts due to not placing emphasis on certain
criteria over others.
Additional differences in state statutes include
who is arbitrating. In states such as New York and
Pennsylvania, the parties use a tripartite panel
(Malin, 2013). Such panels consist of a neutral and
one person representing each party. Each side,
therefore, has an opportunity to communicate
with the neutral arbitrator through their
representatives throughout the process. Other
states, such as New Jersey and Nebraska, have just
one arbitrator make a decision on the contract
(Malin, 2013). The statutes in place in those two
states are stricter in how the arbitrator makes
decisions than in states with the tripartite system.
It is important to note that not all states allow
for or require interest arbitration. There are states
that do not allow public sector bargaining, so they
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would not even have a need for interest
arbitration. Even in states that do allow public
sector bargaining, there are other ways to resolve
impasse. For some states, when two parties do not
come to an agreement, the contract will be given
up to the legislature to decide what will be the
appropriate contract. In most other situations, the
two parties will simply live under the previous
contract until they can agree a new one. Because
having public safety workers go on strike is so
dangerous for the general public, this method is
still better than allowing them to go on strike.
Theoretical Framework
In addressing problems with interest
arbitration, scholars have tested both the chilling
and narcotic effect of the practice. These theories
were developed as ways to explain or predict
interest arbitration impasse behaviors. Nash's
equilibrium influences these mid-level theories in
that it provides an underlying theory of impasses.
However, Nash's equilibrium does not take into
account many of the other variables that could
lead to impasse, so it is not particularly useful as
an all-encompassing theory of collective
bargaining behavior. Nonetheless, it is important
to have a basic understanding of it in order to see
that impasse may occur even without outside
factors pressuring the bargaining partners, and as
such it is important for finding the potential root
of the chilling effect or the narcotic effect.
Nash's Equilibrium. When two parties
negotiate, there is potential for them never to
come to an agreement. In game theory, when two
parties have reached a point where changing their
position would render no benefit to them given
what the other party has offered, this is called
Nash's equilibrium (Champlin & Bognanno, 1985).
Nash's equilibrium is an important concept for
interest arbitration, as the point at which this
equilibrium is reached can lead to impasse, and,
therefore, interest arbitration. This theory is
necessary to understand before talking about the
chilling and narcotic effects because it explains
how an impasse may develop. Impasse due to
Nash's equilibrium, however, is an impasse that
relies on purely rational actors in a bargaining
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scenario. A completely rational actor is an
impossible idea in collective bargaining, as there
are many other factors that go into negotiations
besides the economic factors, and there isn't
always perfect information between the parties.
Chilling and Narcotic Effects.
The most popular theories concerning
problems with interest arbitration are the chilling
effect and the narcotic effect. Each of these effects
has been studied to understand how interest
arbitration influences negotiations.
The chilling effect occurs when parties favor
an early impasse instead of bargaining to a
settlement. The idea is that the negotiators feel
that they cannot possibly get a good settlement,
and that there will be no loss of productivity or
money due to the interest arbitration system, so
they might as well arbitrate rather than settle.
Outside factors are not account for in the theory.
Rather, in order for the chilling effect to be
operative, the parties must stop negotiating due
to their ability to achieve a contract through
arbitration that is more beneficial than a contract
through a negotiated settlement. This means that
parties would not be subject to a chilling effect,
per se, if they favor an early impasse due to
political or other outside pressures. This definition
of the chilling effect is both beneficial and
unfortunate, because it is precise yet constrained.
It is beneficial in the fact that it can be tested in
experiments and through observation. The
problem, however, is that the definition does not
take into account other factors that often affect
impasses in negotiations. Unfortunately, there is
no other theory in the literature that does
incorporate outside factors.
The narcotic effect is defined as a consistent
recurring use of interest arbitration—that is, the
parties have become addicted to interest
arbitration. Reliance on arbitration rather than
negotiations is an abuse of a practice that is
intended to be used only in exceptional
circumstances. This abuse may occur when
interest arbitration is perceived as having a low
cost or low risk.
The problem with the narcotic effect is that it
allows for lazy negotiating, where parties only
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negotiate as a formality instead of working on
lasting solutions for their problems. If parties are
subject to the narcotic effect, they are essentially
not bargaining, but rather having a third party
continually decide their contract.
Model
In order to explore the issue of interest
arbitration, one must start with a working model
of negotiations. The model for negotiations is
based on of Rubinstein's bargaining model. This
model is merely a beginning of the model used in
this paper, but it is the basis for generally used
bargaining
methods.
While
Rubinstein's
bargaining model begins the process of
negotiations, the model continues to show what
happens in a system where the bargaining process
is not allowed to end unless a contract is created.
Rubinstein's Bargaining Model. Rubinstein's
bargaining model comes from game theory. The
idea behind the model is that each party starts
with a position that is different from the opposing
party. They will then each take turns moving
towards the other party's position until they either
agree with each other or they have nothing left to
gain by changing their position. When the two
parties reach a place where neither side has

Internal/External Politics
Funding
State Laws
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anything to gain by changing its position, they are
in Nash's equilibrium.
Negotiation Model. The negotiation model
starts with Rubinstein's bargaining model. As the
two sides go back and forth, if they do not reach
an agreement, they have two options. The first
option is to move to a non-binding process of
mediation or fact finding. The mediator will then
attempt to get both parties to agree to a contract,
however this may or may not be effective. This
then may be followed by interest arbitration.
When the parties reach the process of interest
arbitration, they have entered into a form of
equilibrium. When the parties are unable to come
to an agreement as rational parties who have
nothing more to gain by offering a concession,
they are in Nash's equilibrium (Subbarao, 1978).
However, given other factors that alter how either
party might behave, there are other equilibriums
that may be reached. The other forms of
equilibrium are reached when the payoff for no
longer bargaining outweighs the payoff for
continuing to bargain. There may still be a solution
that is acceptable to both parties by continued
bargaining, but if one party has even more to gain
by not bargaining, they will stop bargaining.

Mediation
Fact Finding

Negotiations
Settlement

Interest
Arbitration
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MEDIATING AND EXTERNAL FACTORS
Disputant Optimism and Risk Aversion
Interest arbitration has multiple effects on the
mindset of negotiators. For example, a party may
be more willing to proceed to interest arbitration
if it expects to have a sympathetic arbitrator.
Arbitration is a field where being neutral is
necessary to one’s professional standing. Without
being completely neutral in every case, an
arbitrator could develop a reputation for being
more beneficial to one party than the other. When
this happens, or if negotiators perceive a
particular bias towards their party, then they have
what is called “disputant optimism” (Dickinson,
2004). The idea is that the negotiator, or
disputant, is optimistic that his or her offer is more
likely to get a favorable outcome than the other
side. Those who do not believe that the arbitrator
will be favorable towards them tend to be more
likely to reach a settlement, even if it is not one
that they particularly want. The perception of
neutrality in a third party is important in an
interest arbitration system, which is why it is
important that both sides have an equal say in
selecting the arbitrator. Similarly, a tripartite
panel assures that all sides are represented in the
decision (Malin, 2013).
Risk aversion is also an important concept for
all negotiations. Theoretically, final offer
arbitration was created so that parties have a
higher level of risk when entering arbitration
(Dickinson, 2004). Parties do not want the high risk
associated with going to arbitration, because
there is the potential that they will not win. The
more risk averse a negotiator is, the more likely
they are to give concessions knowing that if they
do they will get a contract. Even if the contract is
not what they want, it is perceived as being safer
than going to an arbitrator who could give over all
the demands to the other side. In theory, this
reduces impasse rates in final offer arbitration
states. Conventional arbitration is known to be
less risky, because there is a perceived notion that
the arbitrator will end up splitting the economic
issues halfway between management and the
union (Dickinson, 2004). This could lead to higher
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impasse rates, as parties see less risk associated
with going to arbitration versus continuing to
concede sections of the contract.
Politics
In public sector bargaining, politics play a large
role and, in fact, are inseparable from the
negotiations process. This will have an impact on
whether or not a party is willing to go to interest
arbitration instead of working towards a
negotiated settlement. Besides governmental
politics, the politics of a particular organization or
union has a large impact on negotiator behavior. A
negotiator for a union might know that he/she
could never get the contract that the membership
wants, so he/she might be more willing to go to
interest arbitration. This allows the negotiator to
get the contract that he/she would otherwise
negotiate for, without having to get the
membership to ratify the contract. This is a
breakdown of the purpose of the interest
arbitration system. The system is designed as a last
resort, and should only be used when negotiations
are impossible between two parties. If a party uses
the system to bypass internal organizational
processes, then it needs to address issues within
the organization rather than relying on arbitration
to mask the problems.
Ability to Pay. The ability to pay is becoming
increasingly important in public sector bargaining.
For many years, settlements created unfunded
liabilities whose effects were felt only years later.
In the private sector, the company and the union
negotiate over how to spend money that is
generated through the firm’s revenues. In the
public sector funding comes mainly from taxes,
but also from the sale of bonds, various
investments, aid from other levels of government,
user fees, etc. Often this means that it is difficult
to secure funding in the public sector, particularly
when raising taxes is politically perilous. That said,
since taxpayers have a legal obligation to pay
while private sector customers may take their
business elsewhere, ability to pay can be difficult
to determine.
Nonetheless, funding is a
requirement for most arbitrators to look at when
determining an award.
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Best Alternative to Negotiated Agreement.
The best solution to getting a contract is generally
agreed to be a negotiated settlement. However,
depending on what side one is on, this may not be
the case. In these events, negotiators will often
determine what is their best alternative to a
negotiated agreement, or a BATNA. A BATNA
comes about in multiple forms, be it going on
strike, interest arbitration, or operating under an
expired contract. In the public sector, a BATNA
could be to go to interest arbitration, because
comparable pay rates in the area are much higher
than at that particular organization. If these pay
rates cannot be achieved through negotiations,
then the negotiator would be enticed to end
negotiations in favor of interest arbitration.
BATNAs are important in negotiating, because one
cannot be expected to always get a contract that
satisfies both sides. At times, a BATNA can be used
as a negotiating tool where one side convinces the
other that they have options if it does not get what
it wants in an agreement in order to get a
settlement.
OUTCOMES
Experimental Outcomes
Before discussing the experimental outcomes,
it is important to note that the experiments were
focused on the chilling effect rather than the
narcotic effect. This is because the narcotic effect
relies on outside forces that are excluded from the
negotiating games that make up the experiments
done in these studies. The chilling effect can be
distilled to the idea that knowing that there will be
a non-zero sum solution to the bargaining problem
negotiators are less likely to bargain to settlement
if they believe they could lose less by going to
impasse. This theory has been tested by both
Orley Ashenfelter's and David Dickinson.
Ashenfelter's experiment was created to
determine the difference in impasse rates
between no arbitration, conventional arbitration,
final offer arbitration, and a so called tri-offer
arbitration (Ashenfelter, Currie, Farber, & Spiegel,
1992). Tri-offer arbitration is a system where the
arbitrator is forced to pick one of the final offers,
or a fact-finder's decision. This method is not
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common in most interest arbitration cases,
however for the sake of inclusion it is used in this
experiment. The experiment was set up to be a
bargaining game with four groups. The four groups
included the three different arbitration groups as
well as a control group that would not be subject
to arbitration (Ashenfelter et al., 1992). Bargaining
would last for twenty rounds, with arbitration
being introduced after the first ten rounds. At the
beginning of the experiment, bargainers in the
control group were told that they would receive a
small amount of money if they could come to an
agreement. If they did not come to an agreement,
however, they each would receive nothing. The
arbitration groups were told that after ten rounds
of bargaining they would be forced into arbitration
if they could not come to a settlement. Each team
was told what type of arbitration they would be
forced to use, however they were not told how the
arbitrator was to make their decision. They were
also given a list of previous awards by the
arbitrator.
The experiment concluded with interesting
results. The major result was that impasse rates
did not change between the first and second sets
of rounds in the control group; however they
increased significantly in all other groups. Not only
did the arbitration groups increase their impasse
rates, but they started at higher impasse rates in
the first ten rounds than the control group did
(Ashenfelter et al., 1992). This finding was
significant in that it means either the non-control
groups were randomly less risk adverse than the
control group, or that because they knew they
were going to be using arbitration later they were
experiencing the chilling effect even in the first
rounds. Holding this finding aside, it is important
that all the arbitration groups increased their
impasse rates as it shows that the chilling effect
can occur even when all outside influence is
negated.
What is particularly interesting in this study is
it demonstrates that contrary to expectations,
final offer arbitration showed larger impasse rates
compared to conventional or tri-offer arbitration
(Ashenfelter et al., 1992). What is strange about
this is that final offer arbitration has been
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theorized and studied as causing lower impasse
rates in general. Ashenfelter comments that the
reason for this is likely due to the fact that
bargainers tended to get closer to a settlement
with final offer arbitration, however failed to
reach an agreement because they felt that they
would get a marginally better final result. This is
because they believed their final offer was the
most reasonable offer compared to the other
bargainer, so they were reducing the risk
associated with impasse in final offer arbitration
by being closer than their opponent.
Dickinson's experiment sought to further
clarify the results from Ashenfelter's study.
Dickinson took a similar approach to Ashenfelter's,
however changed a few of the rules. The new rules
were that each bargaining pair experienced
negotiations in each of the types of arbitration
(Dickinson, 2004). Also, Dickinson changed the trioffer arbitration type to a type he called CombA
arbitration, which allowed for either taking the
final offers or deciding somewhere in between
(Dickinson, 2004). Finally, Dickinson also explained
how the arbitrators got to their previous decisions
as a way to control for how the bargainers decided
on their strategies.
The results of this study are similar to the
results from Ashenfelter's experiment. In general,
it was found that interest arbitration led to
significantly higher impasse rates compared to
non-arbitration bargaining (Dickinson, 2004). Also
significant is that this study also showed that final
offer arbitration led to higher impasse rates
compared to conventional arbitration (Dickinson,
2004). The highest rate of impasse came from the
proposed CombA arbitration (Dickinson, 2004).
This study hypothesized that CombA would lead to
the lowest rate of impasse, however the author
found that this was absolutely not the case. The
finding that impasse rates were greater with
arbitration is important because it adds to the
significant literature that attempts to show the
chilling effect. The fact that both of these
experimental studies show that final offer
arbitration leads to greater impasse rates than
conventional arbitration is interesting, in that it
shows the opposite from what most observational
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studies show. What is important in this study is
that the statistical analysis showed that the
difference in impasse rates from final offer
arbitration to conventional arbitration were
barely significant (Dickinson, 2004). Compared to
the difference between arbitration and nonarbitration, these findings are not particularly
important in reality. If the impasse rates were
extremely different between forms of arbitration,
then it would be clear that states should adopt one
form over the other. If there is little difference,
however, in actual impasse rates between them,
then the cost in time and effort to change certain
state laws in too high.
Limitations. These studies are helpful in that
they provide actual experimental data, however
they also have significant limitations. Major
among these limitations is that these negotiation
games take place in tightly controlled
environments without any external influence. The
people who participated do not have any political
affiliation with one another, nor do they need to
continue a working relationship with one another.
They also have no direction or motives other than
getting the most that they can overall, whereas in
a real bargaining situation one item in a contract
will be more important than another. In most
contracts in the public sector, if both sides cannot
come to an agreement, they likely will live with the
current contract. In the experiments, if both sides
cannot come to an agreement, then both sides
lose. The difference with these situations is that
living under a previous contract is not a lose-lose
situation. Depending on which side is pushing for
provisions in a new contract, the expiration of a
previous contract will impact one side over the
other. This experiment does not take into account
that one side will likely bend further than the
other in order to get a contract because they have
a need to gain certain provisions, such as a pay
increase or cut.
Observational Outcomes
The bulk of the literature on both the chilling
effect and the narcotic effect comes from
observing
different
arbitration
systems
throughout the United States. In this literature,
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there have been varying degrees of agreement on
the effects. In general, the chilling effect and the
narcotic effect appear to be real, and they appear
to have an effect on impasse in the public sector.
It is difficult to come to a definite conclusion, since
different studies have used different definitions
and methodologies. Due to the varying nature of
the studies there is room for debate about how
strong each of these effects are. While it is difficult
to decide how strong these effects are, there is
definite evidence that impasse rates are higher in
interest arbitration than they are in a strike
system. Also, there is evidence that impasse rates
are higher in conventional interest arbitration
than they are in final offer arbitration.
Chilling Effect. Frederic Champlin and Mario
Bognanno sought to answer whether or not the
chilling effect existed in Minnesota, and published
the results in 1985 (Champlin & Bognanno, 1985).
The study consisted of tracking data about
arbitration rates and settlement rates from 1973
to 1980. The arbitration rates were compared to
the settlement rates in other parts of the state
that did not involve interest arbitration. They
mentioned that there are other factors that may
need to be controlled in this study, such as politics,
economic variances, and legal differences. While
these factors were mentioned, Champlin and
Bognanno believed that they were unimportant
for the study, due to the fact that the cases that
they studied all occurred in similar locations, and
thus similar circumstances (Champlin &
Bognanno, 1985).
The results of this study focused on one major
conclusion. In cases where interest arbitration was
the final step of the dispute resolution process,
thirty percent of negotiations ended up in interest
arbitration. This is compared to cases where
employees were allowed to strike and where
impasse was reached only nine percent of the time
(Champlin & Bognanno, 1985). This is a significant
difference in impasse rates. Also in the results, it is
discussed that they were unable to control for
some factors that may or may not have been
important. They discuss that some of the nonessential employees had the choice of either going
on strike or asking for interest arbitration, so some
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of the data may or may not have been completely
accurate. That being said, if they controlled for
those who went to interest arbitration as nonessential employees, it would only reduce the nine
percent, making the contrast to the thirty percent
even larger.
One thing that this study was unable to
explore was the difference in rates between
different types of interest arbitration. Since the
state law specifies the type of interest arbitration
that they use, they would have had to compare to
a different state using a different arbitration
scheme. This is not particularly helpful when
studying interest arbitration impasse rates,
because they would have to take into account all
the other economic and political differences
between the states before they could possibly
come up with a decent comparison.
Thomas Kochan wrote a paper in 2010 on both
the chilling effect and the narcotic effect. This
paper is the latest addition to his work on the
subjects that started in the late 1970s. In the
paper, Kochan looks at data from New York since
the 1960s to discover how the impasse rates have
changed over time (Kochan, Lipsky, Newhart, &
Benson, 2010). The results were less than
expected, considering the work that had been
done before, as well as the experimental
outcomes that have been discussed. Kochan found
that impasse rates were higher with interest
arbitration than they were without interest
arbitration, but the rates were not as high or
consistent as they had been in the past (Kochan et
al., 2010). Kochan notes that wages have not
increased to unsustainable levels, and because
New York uses a tripartite panel to arbitrate their
contracts, he believes that there is little to no
chance of getting a bad award (Kochan et al.,
2010). This is all important, because it would
appear that the initial fears of interest arbitration
have mostly gone away. There is still the problem
that impasse rates tend to increase due to interest
arbitration, however this might not be as big of a
problem as it was once believed to be. Compared
to the price of having workers in public safety
positions going on strike, having them use interest
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arbitration a bit more often does not have such a
high cost.
Narcotic Effect. The narcotic effect was one
of the original theories of what happens to
impasse rates under interest arbitration. Before
interest arbitration became an important
institution in public sector bargaining, there was a
worry that parties would end up relying on
interest arbitration time after time instead of
being able to settle their own contracts. This
theory has taken an interesting turn in that in
general it is denounced as being untrue, however
there is significant evidence that within the first
three or five years of an interest arbitration law
being introduced, there does exist a narcotic
effect. Thomas Kochan was the leading researcher
into the narcotic effect from the late 1970s to the
early 1980s, when interest in the topic seemed to
cease. More recently, there have been a few
attempts to look at the data again, including by
Kochan himself.
One of the first studies on the narcotic effect
was the 1978 journal article by Thomas Kochan
and Jean Baderschneider. This study looked at
rounds of bargaining for New York fire fighters and
police officers starting from 1968 (Kochan &
Baderschneider, 1978). They found that since that
date, there was an increase in impasse rates for
both fire fighters and police officers. Interest
arbitration did not become law until 1975 in New
York, and they discovered that once it had become
law, impasse rates jumped sixteen percent
(Kochan & Baderschneider, 1978). Not only were
parties more likely to go to impasse, but they
became more likely to successively use interest
arbitration to settle their contracts. They believed
that this was a clear indication that the narcotic
effect existed, and was something to be
concerned with. In their conclusion they noted
that the problems that caused the impasse in the
first place were carried over to future bargaining
sessions (Kochan & Baderschneider, 1978). This is
important, as it shows that the narcotic effect
allows for parties to never truly settle differences
that could lead to better negotiations in the
future, instead relying on third parties to write
contracts. As a form of dispute resolution, interest
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arbitration does not appear to resolve and
disputes in this study. If both parties are focused
on just getting a contract instead of fixing
problems, then they are increasingly likely to use
interest arbitration in the future.
Kochan and Baderschneider's findings did not
seem persuasive to Richard Butler and Ronald
Ehrenberg. Butler and Ehrengberg decided to
analyze the same data that was in Kochan and
Baderschneider's study using a different statistical
analysis. In their paper, they discussed that
Kochan and Baderschneider were incorrect in
their blanket statement that the narcotic effect
existed (Butler & Ehrenberg, 1981). They noticed
that in the last three bargaining rounds of the fire
fighters and police officers there existed a reverse
narcotic effect (Butler & Ehrenberg, 1981). By that
they mean that there was an inverse relationship
between having gone to interest arbitration and
then going to use it again. They noted several
reasons for why this trend emerged. They believed
that parties used the interest arbitration more
often at the beginning because it was new, and
they believed that it would be a cheaper way to
solve disagreements than going through more
difficult negotiations (Butler & Ehrenberg, 1981).
The novelty of interest arbitration seemed
enticing for the parties, because they were given
an opportunity to negotiate without worry of
losing out completely. However, Butler and
Ehrenberg believed that this novelty wore off
fairly quickly once parties realized that the
settlements that they were getting from the
arbitrator were not particularly beneficial to one
or both sides. As such, they concluded that while
the narcotic effect appears when an interest
arbitration law is passed, it quickly subsides due to
both parties discovering what it actually entails.
Not to be outdone, Kochan responded to the
claims that his data was incorrectly analyzed. In an
article published in 1981, Kochan attempts to
establish what his original findings were, and how
Butler and Ehrenberg were able to come up with
such different results. The argument that Kochan
gives is that the way that they had done their
statistical analysis versus how he did his is not
problematic on its own. However, because they
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neglected to use data that included groups that
always or never used interest arbitration, they
were unable to replicate his results (Kochan &
Baderschneider,
1981).
Kochan
and
Baderschneider explain that using a conditional
probability test to determine the recurrence of
impasse allows them to use the total data of
impasse rates for all fire fighters and police
officers, however the regression analysis that was
used in Butler and Ehrenberg's paper ignores a
subset of the data (Kochan & Baderschneider,
1981). A different problem that he had with the
other study was in the definition of the narcotic
effect. Butler used a strict definition of the
narcotic effect where the parties must rely on
interest arbitration always after they use it,
whereas Kochan used a looser definition that
allows for periods where parties do not use it as
often (Kochan & Baderschneider, 1981). A loose
definition of the narcotic effect allows for an
understanding that labor relations theory has a
hard time in perfectly explaining behaviors,
because so much of what happens is entangled
with outside factors.
James Chelius took to the task of trying to find
an answer that could satisfy both Kochan and
Butler's studies. In 1985 Chelius published an
article that looked at the data that both the other
studies used, as well as data from Iowa, Indiana
and Pennsylvania' new public sector collective
bargaining laws. In the study, Chelius uses a
statistical analysis that both the other studies
agreed was a fair way to determine the narcotic
effect (Chelius & Extejt, 1985). In doing so, he also
defined the narcotic effect as, “a decrease or
increase in the subsequent use of an impasse
procedure as a result of the parties' having
previously used the procedure” (Chelius & Extejt,
1985). The definition is important, because the
previous two studies were unable to come to an
agreement on what the official definition should
be when looking at the data. Because of this,
Chelius defines the narcotic effect in a way that
both parties would be comfortable with, as it is not
so broad to include other effects such as the
chilling effect, but is also not so narrow to be
impossible to determine. After setting up the
study to be fair to both other sides of the narcotic
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effect argument, Chelius determines that both
studies have some truth to them (Chelius & Extejt,
1985). In particular, under the New York data that
both the other studies analyzed, Chelius found
that there did exist a narcotic effect within the first
three years of bargaining, however after that
there appeared to be no narcotic effect at all
(Chelius & Extejt, 1985). When interpreting the
data from the other states, Chelius was unable to
find any positive narcotic effect, with only a small
amount of negative narcotic effect in Pennsylvania
(Chelius & Extejt, 1985). These results are
important, because looking at just one state's
particular laws and rules cannot be used to
determine an overall theory for interest
arbitration. In looking at three other states,
Chelius showed that the narcotic effect can exist
to a small extent, however it is not as important as
was once feared.
Limitations. All the studies on the narcotic
effect provide good statistical analyses of various
years and states where interest arbitration occurs.
However, they still only have addressed four
states that use interest arbitration and do not
attempt to see what other states may show. They
do a good job in explaining how the narcotic effect
is not particularly persuasive as a theory in interest
bargaining, however it would be helpful to see
other states' data as well. There exists another
problem where the other factors that impact
bargaining are not addressed. They all succumb to
the idea that if parties go to impasse multiple
times, then it is indicative of the narcotic effect.
This type of study is limited in that there could
exist a narcotic effect that is not particularly
powerful. But due to other political or economic
issues at hand, the parties may still resolve their
contract. Trying to determine where the narcotic
effect exists and to what extent in this case would
prove to be impossible, however it is worth noting
that the possibility does exist.
Other approaches. Studies have moved
towards looking at negotiations and alternative
dispute resolution not within the confines of
certain effects, but rather on the other conditions
that benefit or take away from the collective
bargaining system. These studies have stepped
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away particularly from the chilling and narcotic
effects, because they have found that while these
effects are important, the economic and political
conditions during negotiations can have a larger
impact on impasse rates.
In a retrospective article on public sector
collective bargaining, Charles Craver explores the
many factors around collective bargaining. The
article breaks down public sector collective
bargaining into areas such as the impact of politics
on collective bargaining, and dispute resolution
techniques (Craver, 2013). Each section describes
the particular problems faced in the public sector
for each subject. For example, Craver explains how
alternative dispute resolution techniques were
created for public sector bargaining because the
general public called for it, instead of having
expensive strikes that would be a drain on tax
dollars (Craver, 2013). The most important section
of this paper is the section on politics. Craver
eloquently specifies two major issues to consider
in public sector bargaining, namely the lack of
profits and the fact that both parties are political
in nature (Craver, 2013). Being political in nature
is meant by the fact that both sides are held up to
elections for power, so both sides are held
responsible by their constituents. This leads to
difficulty in negotiations, because if one side
agrees to another side's demands, then they are
seen as weak, or unworthy to lead. This can lead
to a usage of the arbitration system to relinquish
any responsibility from the leaders. They would
want to release their responsibility in the case that
they know they will not get a decent contract, but
cannot sell the idea to their constituents without
getting into trouble themselves.
CONCLUSION
Impasse is a topic that is crucial to study in
labor relations. If we are able to reduce the
amount of impasse that occurs while promoting
good behaviors from both management and labor,
then everyone benefits. Interest arbitration does
not improve impasse rates, however it does help
with other problems in collective bargaining. For
one, it allows for collective bargaining to occur
between public safety workers and the
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government without fear that they will go on
strike. Also, it allows for some of the more
politically difficult negotiation situations to go
forth without embarrassing one side or the other
unnecessarily. That being said, it also stunts
genuine agreements from being made. Impasse
rates are higher in a system that ends with interest
arbitration than a system that does not include
interest arbitration at all. During experimental
studies, it was found that impasse rates increased
substantially under an interest arbitration system.
Not only that, but final offer arbitration led to
impasse more than conventional arbitration.
Outside of experimental situations, impasse rates
still were seen as larger under arbitration than
when striking was an option. The problem with
this is that it can lead to higher costs to
negotiations through time and money spent on
arbitration. However, it is a cheaper alternative to
a strike situation, but does not do anything to
promote good labor relations. Parties are not
compelled to fix their differences in a way that will
help in future negotiations, but rather are allowed
to sit back and rely on the system to take care of
contracts. This is especially an issue if parties tend
to keep returning to the interest arbitration
system.
The narcotic effect appears to have been an
unnecessary worry, as there is no strong evidence
that it really exists. If it does exist, then the
evidence clearly points to the fact that after three
to five years of an interest arbitration law being
implemented, the narcotic effect seems to
disappear. On its own, this shows how the narcotic
effect is not something that should be a concern
for its ability to sustain impasse rates, however it
does have some implications for areas that decide
to implement an interest arbitration system. The
Employee Free Choice Act included a provision
that would have required interest arbitration for a
first contract. If the evidence about the narcotic
effect is reliable, it would suggest that the Act
could have caused a large uptick in impasse and
therefore interest arbitration in the private sector.
However, since interest arbitration would not
have been required after the first contract, the
increase in impasse rates would likely have
subsided after the first contract. In terms of public
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policy, this portion of the Employee Free Choice
Act could have been problematic for employers in
particular. However after the first contract it
would likely not have contributed to impasse rates
in a substantial way.

Kochan, T., & Baderschneider, J. 1981.
Estimating the Narcotic Effect: Choosing
Techniques That Fit the Problem.
Industrial and Labor Relations Review,
35(1).
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